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NextWave: The Double Edged Sword
Paige E. Barr*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The role of regulatory agencies once a debtor declares bankruptcy
was the center of debate for many years. It was unclear what powers,
in regard to licenses issued to regulatory companies, the regulatory
agency held after the company filed bankruptcy. On a number of occasions, courts rejected arguments by government agencies that they
should be exempted from various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
("Code") that contain no explicit government exceptions. In 2003 the
Supreme Court considered the issue and refused to except a regulatory agency from a section of the Code that did not contain a governmental exception. Specifically the Court prohibited the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") from revoking commercial
spectrum licenses from parties that had defaulted on their required
installment payments.
The implications of the NextWave decision are two-sided. First as to
the benefits of NextWave, the decision brought certainty to governmental agencies when dealing with bankrupt companies. Secondly,
the decision promotes the function and theories of the Bankruptcy
Code. Third, it has enabled companies, such as NextWave, to reorganize, whereas before they were left without any assets to stimulate
reorganization. Finally, the NextWave decision clearly delineates that
governmental agencies must comply with all laws, not just those that
they oversee.
However, the decision has also left some unanswered questions and
difficult implications. The aftermath of the NextWave decision has
completely invalidated the purpose of the Federal Communications
Act of 1934, it has subordinated important public policies, and has
failed to provide a clear understanding of the bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction when dealing with governmental agencies.

* DePaul University College of Law, J.D., 2004, University of Pittsburgh, B.A., 2001.
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BACKGROUND

In order to understand the concepts behind the Court's decision as
well as its implications, a basic understanding of various sections of
the Bankruptcy Code as well as the Federal Communications Act is
needed.
A.

Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction over Property of the Estate

When a debtor files bankruptcy § 362 of the Code provides an automatic stay of all creditor efforts to obtain property of the estate.1 The
automatic stay prevents creditors from attempting to collect from the
debtor. 2 It becomes effective immediately upon a debtor's filing and
does not require judicial action. 3 The debtor's benefit from the automatic stay is that the stay relives the debtor of creditor harassment
and allows assessment of the debtor's financial situation without interference from creditors. 4 Failure to provide the debtor this period of
reprieve would drastically limit the debtor's chance for reorganization.5 Creditors also benefit from the automatic stay since it guarantees that the assets of the estate will be preserved for equal treatment
6
in the bankruptcy proceedings.
While § 362(a) provides for the automatic stay, § 362(b) provides
exceptions to the automatic stay. 7 Section 362(b)(4) states that the
filing of a bankruptcy petition does not operate as a stay to a governmental unit seeking to enforce its police or regulatory powers against
a debtor. 8 Section 362(b)(4)'s legislative history suggests that while
the exception should allow the governmental body to pursue legitimate police power and regulatory goals, it should not apply so as to
1. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2004).
2. Id.
3. Id. While the automatic stay takes effect immediately, the bankruptcy court's authority to
invoke the stay depends on a jurisdictional grant of authority that permits its enforcement. The
Bankruptcy Court is granted authority for invoking the stay from § 1334(e) of the Code and Title
11. Section 1334(e) grants the district court exclusive jurisdiction over all property of the debtor,
wherever it is located. 11 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (2004). The power granted in § 1334 may be exercised by the bankruptcy court after a district judge assigns the case to a bankruptcy judge under
Title 11. Thus, the court may conduct a uniform proceeding in a single forum.
4. Rafael Ignacio Pardo, Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction and Agency Action: Resolving the
NextWave of Conflict, 76 N.Y.U.L. REV. 945, 947 (2001).
5. Id. at 949.
6. Id. at 947-48.
7. The exception contemplates fraud prevention, environmental protection, consumer protection, and actions to protect public health and safety as permissible regulatory actions unaffected
by the stay. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 342-43, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6299; S. REP.
No. 95-989, at 52, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5838.
8. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (2004).
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except agency action whose aim is to "protect a pecuniary interest in
property of the debtor or property of the estate." 9
In the years preceding the NextWave decision, courts primarily used
two tests to determine if a regulatory agency is excepted from the automatic stay: the "pecuniary purpose" test and the "public policy"
test. 10 Under the "pecuniary purpose" test, a governmental unit was
not excepted from the stay if it primarily sought to protect a pecuniary
interest." The test attempted to distinguish between an effort to pro12
tect the government's pecuniary interest or a public policy effort.
Naturally, the "public policy" test determined whether the government sought to effectuate public policy or to adjudicate private
rights.' 3 Actions to advance private rights by the government were
14
not excepted from the stay.
B.

Bankruptcy Code's Prohibition on Discriminationof
Those in Bankruptcy

Section 525(a) of the Bankruptcy Code prevents any governmental
unit from "revoking, suspending, denying or refusing to renew, or discriminating in any way with respect to, a government license, permit,
employment, or 'other similar grant' to a debtor or former debtor or
its affiliate 'solely because' the debtor is or was in bankruptcy, was
insolvent before it was adjudged a bankruptcy, or did not pay a debt
dischargeable in the bankruptcy case."' 5
Section 525(a) was a source of dispute among courts well before the
NextWave decision. Most of the litigation centered on the interpretation of the statutory language "other similar grant ' 16 and the clause
9. 124 CONG. REc. H32, 395 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
10. See Pardo, supra note 4, at 949 (citing Universal Life Church, Inc. v. United States (In re
Universal Life Church, Inc.), 128 F.3d 1294 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that, under either test, IRS
letter revoking tax exempt status of Chapter 11 debtor-religious organization fell within police/
regulatory exception); NLRB v. Cont'l Hagen Corp., 932 F.2d 828, 833 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting
that "NLRB actions have been exempted from the automatic stay under both analyses"), Eddleman v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 923 F.2d 782, 791 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that Department of
Labor's enforcement proceedings are exempt from stay under either test), overruled in part on
other grounds,Temex Engery, Inc. v. Underwood, Wilson, Berry, Stein & Johnson, 968 F.2d 1003
(10th Cir. 1992) (involving finality of bankruptcy orders); NLRB v. Edward Cooper Painting,
Inc., 804 F.2d 934, 942 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding NLRB unfair labor practice proceeding to be
excepted from automatic stay under either test)).
11. Eddleman, 923 F.2d at 791.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (2004).
16. Neil P. Forrest & Marco-Aurelio Casalins III, NextWave and the Implications of a Broad
Interpretation of § 525(a), AM. BANKR. INST. J. 16 (2003) (stating: "Some courts applied
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"not solely because." Many courts refused to apply § 525(a) when the
government's action was found to have occurred "not solely because"
the debtor was bankrupt. Actions considered "not solely because" include denying or revoking a racing license when it was found that the
debtor lacked financial integrity and future financial resources, and
that the local market was saturated17 as well as revocation of debtor's
license when the license had previously been suspended three times
for failing to maintain insurance, the debtor held racing related debts,
and was in bankruptcy. 18
In NextWave the Court had to decide a conflict between federal
statutory provisions as well. The Court was called on to determine if
§ 525(a) conflicted with the Federal Communications Act, and if so,
which statutory provision controlled. 19
C.

Federal Communications Act

20
The Federal Communications Act of 1934 (hereinafter "FCA")
established the FCC.21 The FCA was designed to control all radio
transmission channels through the use of licenses granted by federal
authority. 22 The FCC was granted the power to issue radio licenses
upon its determination that doing so will serve the "public interest,
§ 525(a) to (1) prevent a state mortgage fund from denying a mortgage to a former debtor ....
(2) denying Florida taxing authorities' attempt to prevent a debtor from obtaining a certification
showing that all state and county taxes were paid, where the taxes were dischargeable in the
debtor's bankruptcy proceeding, and (3) preventing the government from revoking a real estate
license for which payment had been made from a government real estate recovery fund. However, other courts have refused to apply § 525(a) in cases involving state-funded mortgage assistance payments, the eviction of a public housing tenant where pre-petition rent payments were
discharged in bankruptcy, and the application of a driver's license restoration fee."). Id.
17. Will Rogers Jockey & Polo Club, Inc., 111 B.R. 948, 953 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990).
18. In re Christmas, 102 B.R. 447 (Bankr. D. Md. 1989).
19. FCC v. NextWave, 537 U.S. 293 (2003). Around the same time as the NextWave decision,
the Second Circuit also issued a decision strengthening the protections to debtors under
§ 525(a). In re Stoltz. 315 F.3d 80, 95 (2d Cir. 2002). The Stoltz Court applied § 525(a) to bar the
eviction of a debtor from public housing even though she failed to pay pre-petition rent and the
obligation to pay such rent had been discharged in her bankruptcy case. Id. at 89. The court
held that a public housing lease was an "other similar grant" under § 525(a). Id. The Housing
Authority argued that § 365, the Code's executory contract provision, required the debtor to
cure the rent default as a condition of assuming the housing lease. Id. Thus, § 365 presented a
potential conflict with § 525(a)'s anti-discrimination mandate, which the court presumed prevented the eviction of a debtor for failure to pay pre-petition rent. The Second Circuit held that
§ 525 was more specific than § 365 because it applied only to governmental units and government licenses and permits. Id. at 93. The court stated that it is "a basic principle of statutory
construction that a specific statute . . . controls over a general provision." Id. (citing HCSCLaundry v. United States, 450 U.S. 1, 6 (1981)).
20. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-615(b) (2004).
21. Id. § 309.
22. Id. § 301.
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convenience, and necessity. '23 Over the years Congress has amended
the FCA to authorize the FCC to award licenses in different manners.
Traditionally, comparative hearings were held to consider the qualifications of competing applicants. 24 In 1982, the FCA was amended to
25
authorize use of a lottery system in awarding licenses.
Most recently, in 1993 the FCA was amended to authorize use of
competitive bidding, i.e., auctions. 26 The auction procedure was chosen to further develop and speed the development of new technologies and services to benefit the public; 27 assist in the recovery of the
public spectrum;28 and promote efficient and intensive use of the spectrum.2 9 Congress also hoped to eliminate administrative or judicial
delays. 30 In order to promote economic opportunity and competition,
and to eliminate the fear of an increase in concentration among the
telecommunications industries, Congress instructed the FCC to issue
licenses to a wide variety of applicants. 31 In order to accomplish this
objective, the FCC was given, inter alia, the flexibility to design alternate payment schedules for smaller companies bidding on the
32
spectrum.
The FCC decided to designate two of the six auction blocks of spectrum to broadband "Personal Communications Services" ("PCS"),
i.e., the C and F blocks. 33 The licenses were to be awarded through
simultaneous, multiple round auctions. 34 The C and F blocks were
limited to only small businesses and other designated entities. 35 Fur23. Id. § 309(a).
24. Comparative Hearings were criticized for their delay and cost. See Communications
Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-259, § 115, 96 Stat. 1094 (1982).
25. 47 U.S.C. § 309(i); see Communications Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-259,
§ 115, 96 Stat. 1094 (1982). The lottery system was criticized for "encouraging unproductive
speculation for spectrum licenses." H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 248 (1993).
26. 47 U.S.C. § 3090)(1); see Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66,
§ 6002. 107 Stat. 388 (1993). The Act was amended after the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce concluded that:
a carefully designed system to obtain competitive bids from competing qualified applicants [for electromagnetic spectrum licenses] can speed delivery of services, promote
efficient and intensive use of the electromagnetic spectrum, prevent unjust enrichment,
and produce revenues to compensate the public for the use of public airwaves.
H.R. REP. No. 103-111 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 580.
27. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(A).
28. Id. § 309(j)(3)(C).
29. Id. § 309(j)(3)(D).
30. Id. § 309(j)(3)(A).
31. Id. § 309(j)(3)(B).
32. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(A).
33. 47 C.F.R. § 24.709(a)(1) (2004).
34. In re Implementation of Section 3090) of the Communications Act - Competitive Bidding. 9 FCC Rcd. 2348, 11 54, 68 (1994).
35. 47 C.F.R. § 24.709(a)(1),(b) (2002).
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thermore, small businesses bidders were permitted to make installment payments.36 Under the grant of installment payments, C-block
auction applicants were allowed to pay ten percent of their winning
bid in cash by the time of the license grant, 37 with the remainder to be
paid over the ten-year term of the license. 38 The FCC's auction rules
specified that for applicants electing to pay in installments, any license
granted "shall be conditioned upon the full and timely performance of
the licensee's payment obligations under the installment plan, '39 and
the failure to make timely payments would automatically render the
40
license cancelled.
D.

Licensing Cases Before NextWave

In 2000 a Kansas district court, in United States v. Kansas Personal
Communications Services, Ltd, held that the FCC did not violate 11
U.S.C. § 362 by canceling licenses. 41 Because the FCC regulations
dictated that the licenses are automatically canceled upon default, the
court found that the FCC did not act in violation of the automatic stay
provisions. 42 The court also found that the "police and regulatory exception" to the automatic stay was applicable to the cancellation of
43
radio spectrum.
However, in GWI PCS 1, the Fifth Circuit allowed the debtor's obli44
gations to pay the FCC for electromagnetic licenses to be avoided.
The debtor's payment obligations were found avoidable as constructive fraudulent transfers under § 548 of the Code and thus, the debtors
were allowed to retain their FCC licenses as property of the estate.
E. NextWave's Participationin the Spectrum Auctions
NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., and NextWave Power
Partners, Inc. (collectively referred to as NextWave), participated respectively in the FCC's "C-Block" and "F-Block" auctions. 45 NextWave was a start-up company organized to take advantage of the
46
opportunities provided by § 309(j) in the PCS industry.
36. Id. § 24.711.
37. Id.
38. Id. § 24.711(b).
39. Id. § 1.2110(g)(4).
40. 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(g)(4)(iv).
41. United States v. Kansas Pers. Communications Servs., Ltd (In re Kansas Pers. Communications Servs., Ltd), 256 B.R. 807, 812-14 (D. Kan. 2000).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. In re GWI PCS 1 Inc., 230 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 964 (2001).
45. FCC v. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 296 (2003).
46. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 235 B.R. 263, 266 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1998).

2004]

NEXTWAVE v.

FCC

At the auctions, NextWave was the highest bidder for 63 C-Block
licenses, totaling $4.74 billion, and 27 F-Block licenses totaling approximately $123 million. 47 Following the C-Block auctions, NextWave submitted applications for those licenses upon which it was the
winning bidder for review and approval by the FCC. 48 Ninety percent
of the highest bidders at the auction for C-Block licenses were granted
their licenses on September 17, 1996. 49 However, NextWave was not
one of those parties. 50 NextWave was required to wait longer than the
other C-Block licensees because its ownership structure, specifically
its allegedly impermissibly high percentage of foreign ownership was
51
challenged.
The auction of D, E, and F Blocks began in August 1996 and lasted
until January 1997.52 These blocks covered geographical areas across
the country, including areas covered by the 63 C-Block licenses for
which NextWave was awaiting approval. 53 The winning bids on the D,
E, and F block auctions were a fraction of the winning bids in the C54
Block auction.
On January 3, 1997, NextWave was conditionally granted its licenses
after it submitted a plan to bring its capital structure into compliance
with FCC regulations. 5 5 Finally, the FCC granted NextWave its licenses conditional upon NextWave issuing a series of promissory
notes for the balance of its payments on February 14, 1997.56 Then,
on February 19, 1997, in accordance with the FCC regulations, NextWave made a down payment on the purchase price, signed promissory
notes for the balance, and executed security agreements that the FCC
perfected by filing under the Uniform Commercial Code. 57 The security agreements granted the FCC:
a first 'lien on and continuing security interest in all of the Debtor's
rights and interest in [each] License.' In addition, the licenses recited that they were 'conditioned upon the full and timely payment
of all monies due pursuant to . . . the terms of the Commission's
installment plan as set forth in the Note and Security Agreement
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
Inc.),
52.
53.
54.
55.
Inc.),
56.
57.

FCC v. NextWave, 537 U.S. 293, 296 (2003).
NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 235 B.R. 263,266 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1998).
Id.
Id.
FCC v. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. (In re NextWave Pers. Communications,
200 F.3d 43. 47 (2d Cir. 1999).
NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 235 B.R. 263, 266 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1998).
Id. at 266-67.
Id. at 267.
FCC v. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. (In re NextWave Pers. Communications,
200 F.3d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 1999).
Id.
FCC v. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 296-97 (2003).
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executed by the licensee,' and that 'failure to comply with this condition will result
in the automatic cancellation of this
58
authorization.'
Almost all of the C-Block licenses experienced great difficulty in
obtaining the necessary financing as a consequence to the gross disparity in the value of the C-Block licenses to the other blocks. 59 In
early 1997 many of the C-Block licensees requested alternative financing arrangements due to their difficulty in obtaining financing and the
inability to keep up with the installment payments plan.60 The FCC
was responsive to these requests and suspended the C-Block install61
ment payments indefinitely.
The FCC then initiated an elaborate administrative process for restructuring the C-Block license payments.62 In response to its consideration of the C-Block installment payments, the FCC issued a
Restructuring Order on October 16, 1997.63 The Restructuring Order
provided four distinct, mutually exclusive alternatives for the struggling C-Block licensees. 64 Then on March 24, 1998, in response to
many motions for reconsideration, the FCC issued a Reconsideration
Order. 65 The Reconsideration Order was virtually the same as the
Restructuring Order except that it provided the licensees more flexibility in making their choices under the Restructuring Order. 66 The
FCC set a deadline of June 8, 1998 for the C-Block licensees to select
a method of repayment. 67 However, NextWave was still dissatisfied
with the options available under the Reconsideration Order and petitioned the FCC and the District of Columbia Circuit Court for an extension of the June 8 deadline. 68 Both the FCC and the D.C. Circuit
Court denied NextWave's requests and on June 8, 1998, instead of
choosing an option under the Reconsideration Order, NextWave filed
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 69 The drastic devaluation in the C-Block
licenses, as reflected in the values of the subsequently bid D, E and F
58. Id. at 297 (citing Security Agreement between NextWave and FCC j 1 (Jan. 3, 1997), 2
App. To Pet. For Cert. 402(a); Radio Station Authorization for Broadband PCS (issued to NextWave Jan. 3, 1997), 2 App. To Pet. For Cert. 388a).
59. Id.
60. See 12 FCC Rcd. 16436,
11 (1997).
61. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 235 B.R. 263, 267 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1998).
62. Id. The FCC reviewed over 160 public comments regarding the issue and held a public
forum.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 235 B.R. 263, 267 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1998).
68. Id.
69. Id.

2004]

NEXTWAVE

v. FCC

block licenses, was the central factor in the NextWave bankruptcy
70
filing.
Upon filing for bankruptcy NextWave suspended all payments to
the FCC.7 1 It then initiated an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court alleging that the money it owed to the FCC for the CBlock licenses was a fraudulent conveyance, under § 544 of the Bankruptcy Code, because by the time the Commission actually conveyed
the licenses, their value had declined from approximately $4.74 billion
72
to less than $1 billion.
F. NextWave Lower Court Decisions
The bankruptcy court concluded that NextWave's exchange of $474
million in cash and $4.27 billion in promissory notes for the C-Block
licenses was not an exchange of reasonably equivalent value, and
therefore was a fraudulent conveyance. 73 It determined that the fair
market value of the licenses was approximately $1 billion and thus
subsequently held that $3.7 billion of NextWave's bid obligation to the
74
FCC could be avoided.
In making its determination the bankruptcy court rejected the
FCC's argument that, because only the courts of appeals may review
final orders of the FCC, the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to
hear the fraudulent conveyance claim.75 Although the bankruptcy
court acknowledged that governance of the auction process for the
spectrum falls within the FCC's regulatory authority, and that any appeal over an FCC order regarding that process would fall within the
70. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 235 B.R. 263, 266 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1998).
71. FCC v. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 297 (2003).
72. Id. at 297-98.
73. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. v. FCC (In re NextWave Pers. Communications,
Inc.), 235 B.R. 305 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999). Section 544(b) of the Code allows the avoidance of
"any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the debtor
that is voidable under the applicable law." 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (2004). "Applicable law" includes
various state fraudulent conveyance statutes, many based on the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act. Sender v. Simon, 84 F.3d 1299, 1304 (10th Cir. 1996). "In analyzing fraudulent conveyance
claims under the act, courts determine whether the debtor was engaged or about to engage in a
transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to
the size of the transaction. If so, and if the consideration provided by the debtor for the allegedly fraudulent transfer was not reasonably equivalent to what the debtor received in return on
the effective date of the transfer, then the transfer is deemed constructively fraudulently and can
be avoided." FCC v. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. (In re NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc.), 200 F.3d 43, 49 (2d Cir. 1999).
74. FCC v. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. (In re NextWave Pers. Communications,
Inc.), 200 F.3d 43, 49 (2d Cir. 1999).
75. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. v. FCC (In re NextWave Pers. Communications,
Inc.), 235 B.R. 263, 270 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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jurisdiction of the courts of appeals, it did not view the restructuring
orders by the FCC as relating to its regulatory function.7 6 To do so
would give the FCC the authority to define its own status as a creditor
in relation to its licenses or its licensees' creditors, and, in the process,
sidestep federal bankruptcy law.7 7 After finding that it had jurisdiction to consider the claim, the court found the FCC to be a creditor in
this case, and that nothing in "§ 309(j) or elsewhere in the FCA or in
the Bankruptcy Code states that the FCC is exempt from any of the
provisions of the Code which affect is as a creditor. '78 Thus, the FCC
was subject to NextWave's fraudulent conveyance claim and the FCA
79
does not conflict with or preempt state fraudulent conveyance law.
80
The district court affirmed.
On appeal,"' the Second Circuit reversed the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's orders.8 2 The court reasoned that, be76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. NextWave also contended that FCC engaged in misconduct by acting in its regulatory
capacity. NextWave alleged in its Amended Complaint that "[tlhe FCC completely controlled
all aspects of the C-Block auction process, including the rules, timing, and manner in which the
C-Block licenses were issued to [NextWave]. The C-Block licenses constitute all or substantially
all of the [NextWave's] assets. The FCC thus controlled [NextWave's] business and all of its
assets." The bankruptcy court refused to consider the merits of this claim because it found it did
not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the propriety of the FCC's regulatory conduct.
Id. at 271. The claim was never appealed by NextWave.
80. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. v. FCC (In re NextWave Pers. Communications,
Inc.), 241 B.R. 311 (S.D.N.Y 1999).
81. The FCC appealed the district court order, 241 B.R. 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), affirming five
decisions and orders of the bankruptcy court. The following is the timeline of the complicated
procedural history of these five decisions that are appealed by the district court: In re NextWave
Pers. Communications, Inc., 235 B.R. 314 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (June 16, 1999 decision denying motion to lift automatic stay) (NextWave V); NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. v. FCC
(In re NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc.), 235 B.R. 277 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (May 12,
1999 decision on fraudulent conveyance claim (NextWave IV.A) as supplemented by NextWave
Pers. Communications, Inc. v. FCC (In re NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc.), 235 B.R. 305
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (June 22, 1999 decision on remedy) (NextWave IV.B); NextWave Pers.
Communications, Inc. v. FCC (In re NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc.), No. 98-21529
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1999) (oral denial of FCC's motion to dismiss) (NextWave III); NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. v. FCC (In re NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc.), 235
B.R. 272 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (Feb. 16, 1999 decision denying to FCC and granting to debtor
partial summary judgment with regard to date upon which obligations were incurred) (NextWave II); NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. v. FCC (In re NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc.), 235 B.R. 263 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998) (Dec. 7, 1998 decision granting in part and
denying in part FCC's motion to dismiss). For purposes of this paper it is all these decisions will
collectively be referred to as the bankruptcy court decision, unless otherwise noted.
82. FCC v. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. (In re NextWave Pers. Communications,
Inc.), 200 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 1999).
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cause courts of appeals, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 234283 and 47 U.S.C.

§ 402,84 have exclusive jurisdiction over claims challenging final orders
of the FCC, the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to determine
whether the automatic stay applied to the FCC.85 Holding that the
allocation of radio spectrum licenses lay within the FCC's regulatory
purview, the Second Circuit found that the bankruptcy court lacked

86
jurisdiction over NextWave's claim.
Soon after the Second Circuit's decision, the value of licenses rapidly began to rise. 87 NextWave proposed a plan of reorganization that
88
would give the FCC $4.3 billion, including interest and late fees.
However, the FCC refused NextWave's plan and offered the licenses
for re-auction.8 9 The FCC believed that the licenses had been cancelled under the automatic cancellation provisions in the security
agreement. 90 The FCC re-auctioned the licenses and received approximately $16 billion for them. 9 1
NextWave sought reconsideration by the FCC on the license cancellation. The FCC denied this request. 92 NextWave challenged the sale
of the licenses as a violation of the automatic stay. 93 The bankruptcy
court agreed and held the sales void. 94 The bankruptcy court held that
the conduct of the FCC, in declaring debtors in default of their obliga-

tion to make installment payments to the FCC, and in notifying debtors that licenses had been automatically cancelled, violated the

automatic stay as an attempt by the FCC to exercise control over licenses constituting "property of the estate. 9 5 Furthermore, the "auto96
matic cancellation" of debtors' licenses also violated the stay.

83. 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (2004) (delineating the instances in which courts of appeal have exclusive
jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend, or determine the vailidty of certain actions).
84. 47 U.S.C. § 402 (2004) (providing judicial review of the Commission's decision to the District of Columbia Court of Appeal).
85. FCC v. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. (In re NextWave Pers. Communications,
Inc.), 200 F.3d 43, 50 (2d Cir. 1999).
86. Id.
87. Nicole Harris & Jill Carroll, Little Rumbling Ahead of FCC Auction, W.S.J., Dec. 4,2000,
at B14.
88. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 254 F.3d 130, 138 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
89. Id. at 138 (quoting FCC Public Notice DAOO-49, Auction of C and F Block Broadband
PCS Licenses, 15F.C.C.R. 693, 693 (Jan. 12, 2000).
90. Id.
91. See Jill Carroll, Airwaves Auction Pulls in $16.86 Billion, WALL ST. J., Jan 29, 2001, at B4.
92. In the Matter of Public Notice DA 00-49 Auction of C and F Block Broadband PCS Licenses, Order on Reconsideration, 15 FCC Rcd. 17500 (2000).
93. In re NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc., 244 B.R. 253 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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Sticking to its jurisdictional ruling, the Second Circuit again reversed. 97 NextWave appealed the decision to the D.C. Circuit. 98
There NextWave argued that the FCC had violated the automatic
stay9 9 and the antidiscrimination provisions' 0 0 of the Code. 10 1 The
D.C. Circuit ruled in favor of NextWave. It held that the FCC had
violated the antidiscrimination provision of § 525(a), which states that
"a governmental unit may not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew a license ... solely because such bankrupt or debtor ... has not
1 02
paid a debt that is dischargeable . . . under the Bankruptcy Act.1
The court furthermore rejected the FCC's argument that its automatic
cancellation of NextWave's licenses constituted a regulatory action exempt from § 525, since none of the enumerated exceptions in the
Code authorized the FCC's actions. 10 3 In conclusion, the court ordered reinstatement of NextWave's licenses and reiterated the point
that even though the government is a creditor, a company's right to a
04
fresh start should not be impaired.
G.

Supreme Court Decision

In its appeal to the Supreme Court, the FCC argued that 1) it did
not revoke NextWave's licenses "solely because" of nonpayment, 2)
NextWave's obligations were not debts that were dischargeable under
the Code, and 3) that the circuit court's interpretation of § 525 brings
it in conflict with the FCA.' 0 5 The Supreme Court affirmed the D.C.
Court of Appeals. 10 6 The Court held that § 525 prohibits the FCC
from revoking licenses held by a debtor upon the debtor's failure to
make timely payments to the FCC for the purchase of licenses. 10 7 The
Court first rejected the FCC's argument that it did not revoke NextWave's licenses "solely because" of nonpayment.10 8 The Court held
that the fact that the FCC had a valid regulatory motive for its action
97. In re FCC, 217 F.3d 125, 141 (2d Cir. 2000).
98. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 254 F.3d 130 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

99. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2004).
100. Id. § 525(a).
101. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 254 F.3d 130, 139 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
102. Id. at 152.
103. Id. The court also held that the "Code expressly contemplates that bankrupts will sometimes avoid the consequences of late or non-payment they might have faced had they not filed
for bankruptcy." Id. Furthermore, when the FCC decided to allow the Restructuring Order, it
should have expected that its financing activities would be treated no differently than those of
any other creditor. Id.

104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 156.
FCC v. Nextwave Pers. Communications, Inc., 537 U.S. 293 (2003).
Id. at 308.
Id.

108. Id. at 301.
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was irrelevant, since "[§] 525 means nothing more or nothing less than
that the failure to pay a dischargeable debt must alone be the proximate cause of the cancellation, whatever the agency's ultimate motive
may be."' 0 9
The Court went on to also reject the FCC's argument that regulatory conditions, like full and timely payments, are not properly classified as "debts" under § 525(a). 10 Under the Code "debt" means
"liability on a claim,""' and "claim" includes any "right to payment,"1 12 and "right to payment" means an enforceable obligation,
regardless of the Government's objective in imposing the
113
obligation.
The FCC's argument that NextWave's obligations are not dischargeable under § 525 because it is beyond the bankruptcy courts'
jurisdictional authority to alter or modify regulatory obligations also
failed. 1 4 The Court reasoned that dischargeability is not tied to the
existence of such authority." 5 The Code only excepts the debts described in § 523 from discharge. 116 Therefore, the FCC's argument
that the D.C. Circuit had no power to modify or discharge a debt is
irrelevant to whether that court can set aside agency action that violates § 525. 17 All the D.C. Circuit did was set aside the agency action
for a violation of § 525 when it prevented the FCC from canceling
licenses because of the failure to pay debts dischargeable by bank1 18
ruptcy courts.
Lastly, the Court rebuked the FCC's contention that § 525 creates a
conflict with the Communications Act. 119 The Court held that what
the FCC described as a conflict, rather just equates to a policy preference on behalf of the FCC for selling licenses on credit and canceling
licenses rather than asserting security interests when there is a default. 120 Such administrative preferences on behalf of the FCC cannot
1 21
be the basis for denying NextWave its rights.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.

Id. at 303.
11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (2004).
Id. § 101(5)(A).
Pa. Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 559 (1990).
FCC v. Nextwave Pers. Communications, Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 303 (2003).
Id.
Id., see 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(2).
FCC v. Nextwave Pers. Communications, Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 303 (2003).
Id. at 303-04.
Id. at 304.
Id.
Id.
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Justice Breyer wrote the sole dissenting opinion in NextWave. 122
He questioned why "the government, and the government alone,
[should] find it impossible to repossess a product, namely a license,
when the buyer fails to make installment payments. ' 123 He insisted
that the antidiscrimination provisions of the Bankruptcy Code demonstrate that Congress intended only to prevent discrimination based on
a company's bankrupt status.1 2 4 Furthermore, Congress did not intend for the Code to "deprive the American public of the full value of
public assets that it owns.' 25 Justice Breyer expressed worry over
companies that use Chapter 11 strategically; that is, they merely promise to pay for a public asset, go into bankruptcy, avoid the payment
126
obligation, and keep the asset.
H. Reauthorization Bill 1264
Less than one year after the Supreme Court's ruling, the FCC attempted to circumvent the Court's ruling through the FCC
Reauthorization Act. 127 The intent of the Reauthorization Act was to
prohibit the Code from 1) applying to debt obligations arising from
auctions under the FCA and 2) staying payment obligations when a
debtor to the United States has failed to make payments or if its license has been cancelled.12 8 Furthermore, it requests that the debtor
shall have no interest in the proceeds from the auction of any license
129
reclaimed by the FCC.
I.

Settlement of the Spectrum Issue

On April 19, 2004, the government and NextWave reached an
agreement over the licenses.' 30 Under the agreement, which was approved by the Department of Justice, NextWave will be able to keep
its licenses in many of the largest and most lucrative markets, including Baltimore, Boston, Detroit, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia,
122. FCC v. Nextwave Pers. Communications, Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 310 (2003) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
123. Id. at 312.
124. Id. at 313.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 315.
127. S.REP. No. 1264 (2003).
128. Id.
129. Id. Ironically, shortly after the NextWave decision the FCC issued a statement to "faithfully implement the Court's mandate." Rick B. Antonoff, High Court Rebukes FCC in NextWave, 22-May AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 43 (2003).

130. Stephen Labaton, NextWave Pact with F.C.C. Ends Airwave Dispute, N.Y. Times, Apr.
20, 2004, sec. C, page 1, column 5.
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and Washington. 131 In turn NextWave will return to the FCC more
than seventy-five percent of the licenses that have been unused for
some many years.1 32 Those licenses will be reauctioned. 33 The government will also receive $1.1 billion on top of the $500 million down
payment NextWave already made. 3 4 It could also get additional
money if NextWave sells its remaining licenses at sufficiently high
prices.' 35 Under the agreement NextWave will be able to erase its
36
debts to the government and retain licenses in many large markets.1

III.

ANALYSIS

The NextWave decision is a double edged sword. While it brings
certainty to governmental agencies involved with bankruptcies, promotes the function of the Bankruptcy Code and its policies, allows
small financially challenged companies to reorganize it also has disfavored ramifications. The purpose of the FCA is essentially invalidated
by the NextWave decision through the use of strategic Chapter 11
tools; important public policy issues are subordinated; and there is a
lack of certainty as to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction when dealing
with governmental agencies. However, despite these ramifications,
there are still some benefits for the government as a result of the NextWave decision. First, the uncertainty in jurisdictional issues of the
bankruptcy court may very well serve the best interests of the agencies; the issue of assuming or assigning executory contracts may also
resolved, through indirect analysis; and finally there are still self-help
tools that the FCC, or other agencies in its position, may use to leverage its position.
A.

Benefits of the NextWave Decision

The NextWave decision has brought certainty to companies like
NextWave as well as to the law governing governmental agencies.
Before the Court's ruling it was impossible for companies like NextWave to implement a reorganization plan since the success of the plan
depended on the ability to use or resell its licenses.1 37 The NextWave
decision also clarifies that governmental agencies are prohibited from
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Labaton, supra note 130.
137. Rick B. Antonoff, High Court Rebukes FCC in NextWave, 22-May AM.
1, 43 (2003).

BANKR. INST.

J.
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revoking licenses or taking other action against companies in bankruptcy under § 525 of the Code. 138 Furthermore, it is now clear that
governmental agencies must comply with all laws, not just the legislation that they are charged with enforcing, regardless of the existence
39
of laws conflicting with such legislation.
B.

Consequences of NextWave

Regardless of whether the Reauthorization Bill is passed or the fact
that NextWave and the FCC eventually settled their difficulties, the
NextWave decision has its consequences. First, commentators continue to argue that the decision invalidates the FCA's purpose by
opening the door for strategic use of Chapter 11, which serves to frustrate the diversity goals of the FCA. Second, there are important public policy issues that are adversely affected by the decision. Third, the
Court failed to address the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts in matters
concerning federal regulation. This leaves many of the previous bankruptcy cases good law and may serve to strengthen the government's
position in bankruptcy court.
1. Invalidating the Communications Act of 1934's Purpose
Through Strategic Use of Chapter 11
As Justice Breyer's dissent states, the Court's decision implicates
greater strategic use of the Chapter 11 and allows initiatives that may
thwart the purposes of the FCA. 140 For example, a company could
make the initial down payment on a license, declare bankruptcy, and
then still hold the licenses, essentially having an effective call option
on them. 141 The call option can be exercised in two ways. First, the
company could choose to use the license, and then would just need to
raise the necessary financing to bring itself out of bankruptcy. 142 Or
the company could choose to only capture a potential asset appreciation value without developing the license; in this circumstance the
company has the option of negotiating a reorganization or a settlement.143 Finally, if the company does not prefer either option, the
company can let the option expire by allowing the court to distribute
the license in the normal course of the bankruptcy proceedings. 144
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. FCC v. Nextwave Pers. Communications, Inc., 537 U.S. 293. 313 (2003) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
141. Federal Statutes and Regulations, 117 HARV. L. REv. 390, 395 (2003).
142. Id. at 396.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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Another strategic use of Chapter 11 that the NextWave decision
promotes is to allow companies the opportunity to improve their
creditworthiness by filing a Chapter 11 petition. 145 Debt investors can
now rely on the fact that the government cannot revoke a license for
nonpayment as long as the company invokes Chapter 11; thus, companies may now have an easier time obtaining capital to develop new
technologies.

146

Unfortunately, most of these strategic uses that became available
after the NextWave decision, frustrate the diversity goals of the FCA,
which intended to make the telecommunications sector available to
small businesses. These strategic uses enable concentration of the participation in spectrum use, an issue the FCA explicitly wanted to
correct.

147

However, in response to the option market created by NextWave,
there are still some options available to limit the strategic use of
Chapter 11. Creditors still have the ability under the Code to obtain
relief from the automatic stay through the use of the good faith 148 and
lack of adequate protection 149 defenses.150 Under these defenses a
creditor can lift the automatic stay and reclaim assets from bankruptcy. Section 362(d)(1) of the Code provides for relief from the stay
"for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in
property.'

15

' Furthermore, the Code requires a "good faith" require-

1 52
ment for confirmation of a bankrupt's plan of reorganization.
Therefore, a creditor may seek to invoke either of these defenses
153
when seeking relief from the automatic stay.
In effect, the FCC's attempt to obtain diversity in license ownership
resulted in further speculation for small businesses involved in the
auctions. 154 In January 1998, the FCC announced its decision to dis-

145. Id. at 397.
146. Id.
147. 37 C.F.R. § 1.2110(g)(4)(iv).
148. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2004). Courts have used the good faith requirement to prevent
abuses of bankruptcy law at the outset of the bankruptcy process. See In re Victory Construction
Co., 9 B.R. 549 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981).
149. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). A creditor can petition the court for relief from a stay, making a
claim that the value of the collateral may decline during a bankruptcy restructuring. Even if the
court does not lift the stay, it may require that the debtor provide "adequate protection" against
a future diminution in value through cash payments, additional liens, or other means. Id.
§§ 361, 362(d)(1)-(2).
150. Federal Statutes and Regulations, supra note 141, at 398.
151. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (2004).
152. Id. § 1129(a)(3).
153. Federal Statutes and Regulations, supra note 141, at 398.
154. Id.
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continue the use of installment payments. 155 Now bidders are required to pay the Commission in full and up front, thus eliminating
the possibility of the government becoming a creditor since no security interest will be taken. 156 However, this move really just shifted the
market to the private sector, now smaller businesses without sufficient
157
funding will have to secure private financing.
In August 2000 the government curtailed use of the diversity policies. 158 In a very blunt way, this ended strategic abuse of Chapter 11.
The FCC opened two-thirds of its licenses in major markets to all bidders, regardless of the diversity criteria.1 59 Ironically, but not surprisingly, the end of the diversity requirements unveiled the true
participants in the diversity requirement era, as the large telecoms.
Although NextWave itself was considered a start up company,
Qualcomm and Sony provided most of its initial financing.1 60 The
reauction was also played through pawns of the big companies; AT&T
and Cingular both backed two of the key "entrepreneurs" in the bidding. 161 Thus, with the end of the diversity requirements not much
has changed. Smaller entrants are now merely further excluded from
the telecommunications industry.
2.

Subordination of Policy Arguments

Essentially, companies are now able to retain valuable assets in
bankruptcy, rather than worrying about their public policy value. The
Court's decision that the "fresh start" policy takes precedence over
public policy, consequently subordinated some very important policy
considerations. Most importantly, the broadband spectrum licenses, a
valuable public good, went unused at a critical time for the telecom155. Competitive Bidding Proceedings, 63 Fed. Reg. 2315, 2319 (FCC Jan. 15, 1998). Although the FCC's decision to end installment payments occurred before the Supreme Court's
NextWave decision, its motive for doing so was clearly to anticipate the result that NextWave
enabled: a situation in which a company could buy licenses on installment, pay only a down
payment, and then lock up the licenses in bankruptcy. See id. (noting that the cancellation of
installment payments would be effective "until controlling precedent is established or legislation
... is enacted [to ensure that the] provisions of the Bankruptcy Code 1) are not applicable to any
FCC license for which a payment obligation is owed; 2) do not relieve any licensee from payment obligations; and 3) do not affect the Commission's authority to revoke, cancel, transfer or
assign such licenses"). That the FCC never received these assurances means that the cancellation of installment plans is likely permanent.
156. Federal Statutes and Regulations, supra note 141, at 398.
157. Id. at 398-99.
158. See In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules Regarding Installment Payment Financing for Pers. Communications Services Licensees, 15 F.C.C.R. 16266 (2000).
159. Id.
160. Federal Statutes and Regulations, supra note 141, at 399.
161. Id.
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munications industry. 162 Furthermore, the rights of the companies
who innocently purchased the licenses on their reauction were completely disregarded. 163 Finally, the public was prevented from collecting billions of dollars in secured claims from a debtor unable to
164
provide adequate protection.
Throughout the NextWave litigation broadband spectrum licenses,
which are valuable public goods, went unused at a critical time for the
telecommunications industry. 165 When the spectrum was initially auctioned to NextWave the intent was to spur technological innovation
and further use of the spectrum creating efficient technology development. Leaving the spectrum in an unused state for almost eight years
was not in furtherance of these goals. Furthermore, the FCC's attempt to reauction the licenses exacerbated the already existing slump
166
in the wireless industry.
After the FCC reauctioned the licenses, NextWave obtained a judi167
cial stay on the sales pending judicial determination of the issue.
However, at this time the FCC failed to cancel the reauction results,
even though it had no spectrum to give the winners.' 68 Thus, since the
licenses were never delivered to the reauction winning bidders, these
"winning bidders" effectively acquired large liabilities with no offsetting assets. 169 Thus, until the settlement between NextWave and the
FCC in April 2004, these licenses were held up in the bankruptcy process and not effectively being used and the industry suffered as well
from making a large investment in the reauction without receiving any
benefit. During the time that the FCC refused to refund or cancel the
reauction results, the FCC's policy effectively served to harm the wireless service providers and equipment manufacturers, as well as taxpayers by lowering future auction receipts to the U.S. Treasury. 170 At a
time that the industry was already suffering from heavy debt and slow
growth, the effect of the reauction investment did not makes the skies
any more promising for the telecommunications industry.
While settlement has occurred between NextWave and the FCC
and the spectrum is finally being set up for future use, the harm to the
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Federal Statutes and Regulations, supra note 141, at 399.
166. J. Gregory Sidak, The Economic Benefits of Permitting Winning Bidders to Opt Out of
Auction 35, 731 P.L.I. 611, 616 (2002).
167. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 254 F.3d 130 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
168. Sidak, supra note 166, at 616-17.
169. Id. at 617.
170. Id.
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industry in the interim period cannot be overlooked. Lost market values, lost jobs, and lower credit ratings for telecom companies were just
some of the effects of the reauction dilemma. 171 However, while this
was not a favorable period of time for the telecommunications industry, there is certainty in the future after the NextWave decision. The
FCC is now well aware that it may not revoke licenses in this manner
and also now knows how to prevent the tie-up of valuable licenses in
bankruptcy. This knowledge will likely prevent any parallel future
scenario.
The resolution of NextWave was of great import to the bankruptcy
system because it layed down the terms for everyone who invests in a
172
business that relies on a license obtained via a security agreement.
As discussed above, some commentators argue that the NextWave decision allows any company holding any type of regulatory license to
use the license as an option in bankruptcy on the underlying asset and
173
as a means to lock out competition or to secure private financing.
Alternatively, other commentators believe that Congress made a good
policy choice, leaving the financial decisions, in all their many manifestations, to the bankruptcy system. This permits companies that
need a license to operate and compete on equal footing for credit and
investment dollars. 174 Investors can safely take a risk in regulated
businesses without the fear that regulators will shut the business down
175
as soon as the company misses a payment.
3.

Remaining Strength of Agencies Following Nextwave
a.

Jurisdiction

The NextWave litigation could strengthen the government's usual
position in bankruptcy proceedings through jurisdictional questions as
well as the use of executory contracts. Furthermore, the FCC has selfhelp remedies available to it as well.
The Supreme Court did not address the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to consider the legitimacy of agency action. By not ruling
on this issue, the Court let stand governing law in the courts of appeal
that most frequently address administrative law and bankruptcy is171. See generally id. for a more detailed explanation of the economic losses in the period of
time following the reauction.
172. Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Regulators in the Bankruptcy Arena: Who Has the
Power?, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26 (Jul./Aug. 2003).

173. FederalStatutes and Regulations, supra note 141, at 397.
174. Warren & Westbrook, supra note 172.
175. Id.
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sues. 17 6 The bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over issues that require
review of agency action is severely limited by the Court's failure to
consider the issue. 177 The impact of this decision remains to be seen,
not only on the bankruptcy courts' power to consider administrative
action under the APA or Chevron, but also to consider antitrust enforcement agencies' challenges to bankruptcy proceedings, an issue
1 78
that has remained a source of dispute.
b.

Executory Contracts

While the Court did not explicitly address the issue of executory
contracts in its decision, the Court's literal interpretation of the Code
may be construed as favoring one side of this debated issue. Lower
courts have grappled with the issue of whether § 365(c)(1)(A) absolutely bars trustees and debtors-in-possession from assuming executory contracts where applicable law excuses the nondebtor from
accepting performance from a party other than the debtor or debtor179
in-possession.
The language of the section is framed in terms of whether the trustee is proposing to "assume or assign" such an executory contract. 180
Government agencies that are contractors with companies that file for
Chapter 11 relief are particularly interested in the issue because the
Anti-Assignment Act 18 1 bars the assignment of government contracts. 182 The Third Circuit, in In re West Electronics, Inc., held that
the effect of § 365(c)(1)(A) was to bar the debtor from assuming (not
just assigning) a government contract that it had been performing
before it filed for bankruptcy relief. 183
Cases addressing this executory contracts issue, have used two tests
to interpret that statute: a "hypothetical" test and an "actual" test.
The tests consider 1) whether the trustee is proposing to assign a non176. William J. Perstein & Kenneth A. Bamberger, At the Intersection of Regulation and Bankrutpcy: FCC v. Nextwave, 59 Bus. LAW. 1, 18 (2003).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Section 365(c)(1)(A) provides that a:
Trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract . . . whether or not such
contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights ... if applicable law excuses
a party, other than the debtor, to such contract or lease from accepting performance
from or rendering performance to an entity other than the debtor or the debtor in
possession.
11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(A) (2004).
180. Id.

181. 41 U.S.C. § 15 (2004).
182. Perlstein & Bamberger, supra note 176, at 18.
183. In re West Elecs. Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 83 (3d Cir. 1988).
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assignable contract or only seeking to assume it; and 2) if the debtor is
only proposing to assume the contract, whether the section neverthe184
less applies where nonapplicable law would bar any assignment.
Commentators have argued that NextWave's literal interpretation of
the Code favors the hypothetical test. 18 5 Proponents of the hypothetical test are usually government agencies that contracted with parties
that became debtors-in-possession. 18 6 The agencies want flexibility to
decide whether to immediately terminate a debtor's contract with the
government agency.1 87 Actual test proponents argue that a debtor
should be able to assume the same contract it was performing before
it filed for bankruptcy relief.1 88 The NextWave decision rejected such
policy considerations and may make lower courts more likely to side
89
with the hypothetical test.
4.
a.

FCC's Own Remedies
Secured Creditor Status

Although the Court failed to indicate the import of the parties'
debtor-creditor relationship, it did recognize that the FCC had a perfected security interest in the licenses. 190 The FCC should at least
then possess the rights of a secured creditor. 191 Under general bankruptcy rules, if NextWave proposes to cure and reinstate its payment
obligation pursuant to §§ 1123(a)(5)(G) and 1124(2)(a), it will be required to pay its debt in full. 1 92 If NextWave instead proposed to impair the Commission's debt by altering the terms or conditions of the
obligation, the FCC should be entitled to the full value of its allowed
93
secured claim.'
184. Compare Perlman v. Catapult Entm't, Inc. (In re Catapult Entm't, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747,
750 (9th Cir. 1999) (using the hypothetical test), with Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech
Corp., 104 F.3d 489, 493 (1st Cir. 1997 (using the actual test).
185. Perlstein & Bamberger, supra note 176, at 19.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. FCC v. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 297 (2003).
191. Perlstein & Bamberger, supra note 176, at 14.
192. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(G) provides that a bankruptcy plan shall "provide adequate
means for the plan's implementation," such as "curing or waiving of any default." 11 U.S.C.
§ 1123(a)(5)(G) (2004). Section 1124(1) provides that claims are impaired under a plan unless
that plan "leaves unaltered the legal, equitable, and contractual rights to which such claim or
inerest entitles the holder of such claim or interest." Id. § 1124(1).
193. See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc. 462 U.S. 198, 204 (1983) ("The creditor with a
secured interest in property included in the estate must look to [the provisions of the Code] for
protection, rather than to the nonbankruptcy remedy of possession."); see also 11 U.S.C. § 506
(determination of secured status).
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In general, if a creditor is oversecured, i.e., the value of the collateral securing the claim is greater than the amount of the prepetition
claim, it is entitled to insist on payment in full, plus interest, fees and
costs. 194 An undersecured creditor, by contrast, may either choose to
have its claim bifurcated into secured and unsecured portions, or it
may elect instead to insist on payment - in - full in nominal dollars:
payments whose present value must equal the present value of the
collateral and whose total value must equal the amount of the overall
claim. 195 These options should have been available to the FCC as a
196
secured creditor.
b.

Advanced Criteria

Furthermore, agencies may develop criteria for license awards that
considers options other than the ability to meet monetary obligations. 197 Considering criteria such as performance, financial health,
service capacity and other nonmonetary standards would provide the
agency with a strong argument that denial of the license was not based
"solely" on nonpayment of monetary obligations. 198 The agency
should also establish a standardized practice in which it administers
these standards. a99 The more standardized the practice, the less it will
lend itself to be discriminatory. 20 0 This solution also finds support in
the legislative history of § 525, which states that the statute "does not
prohibit consideration of other factors, such as future financial responsibility or ability, and does not prohibit imposition of require' '201
ments such as net capital rules, if applied nondiscriminatorily.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The NextWave decision left benefit as well as consequence. However, the consequence may now be avoided forever if certain steps are
intiated to prevent future instances such as NextWave. The FCC is
now aware that it should not assume the role of a creditor when distributing licenses, and if it does it will be subject to the same rules as
all other parties. The FCC is also aware that it must take alternative
steps to make sure that revocation of a license in not classified as
"solely" because of inability to make payments. Certainty has been
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2004).
See id. § 506(a).
Perlstein & Bamberger, supra note 176, at 20.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id.
Id.
S.REP. No. 95-989, at 81 (1978).
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layed out in this area for governmental agencies to follow, and while it
was a long tough battle to learn this lesson, the lesson has been
learned. Furthermore, the government may still have strength within
the issue of bankruptcy court jurisdiction as well as within the executory contracts area.
Finally, the main lesson of this saga may have been that if Congress
determines that governmental agencies deserve more protection, then
it should act. However, if Congress believes that the FCC is entitled
to protection not already afforded by the Bankruptcy Code, it should
achieve its goal through a process that fits within the existing bankruptcy framework. If, in a specific case the FCC believes it must be
permitted to exercise its regulatory power, its actions should be subject to review by the bankruptcy court in the same manner currently
required of all other governmental bodies and any change with respect to the FCC in the bankruptcy process should occur through the
appropriate forum.

